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REPORT BY THE

Comptroller General

OF THE UNITED STATES

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The Marine Corps Inspection System Should Use Resources More Efficiently

RELEASED

The Marine Corps Inspector General's Field Audit Service could abolish one-third of its positions without hurting its operating capability.

The Marine Corps should improve its inspection system by

- making fewer noncombat activity inspections,
- reducing overinspection and duplication,
- using more civilians, and
- developing causes of problems rather than reporting on compliance with rules and regulations.

This report was requested by the Chairman, Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, House Committee on Government Operations, and is the third in a series of five on Department of Defense inspection activities.



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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

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✓ The Honorable Jack Brooks
Chairman, Subcommittee on Legislation
and National Security H 1506
Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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1- Your letter of November 13, 1978, requested that we
8 review Inspector General operations in the Air Force, Army, ^{35, 20}
Navy, Marine Corps, and Defense Logistics Agency. You also ^{1, 98, 378}
asked us to determine whether the new Department of Defense
policy of releasing Inspector General reports to us solves
the longstanding problem of obtaining inspection reports and
records we need.


We received excellent cooperation from Marine Corps of-
ficials and were provided copies of all reports and support-
ing documents we requested. Thus, we were able to evaluate
the effectiveness of both the nonappropriated fund audit or-
ganization and the inspection system of the Marine Corps In-
spector General. This report discusses the results of our
review and contains several recommendations for strengthening
the audit and inspection systems.

As you requested, we did not obtain written comments
from the Marine Corps. However, we did informally discuss
our findings with Marine Corps officials, and their comments
are included in the report.

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly an-
nounce the contents of this report earlier, we will not dis-
tribute it until 30 days from its date. Then we will send
copies to interested parties and give copies to others upon
request.

Sincerely yours,

Comptroller General
of the United States



COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL
SECURITY, HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

THE MARINE CORPS INSPECTION
SYSTEM SHOULD USE RESOURCES
MORE EFFICIENTLY

D I G E S T

6 The Marine Corps Inspector General's Field Audit Service can save about \$1 million annually by eliminating overstaffing. GAO identified 42 of 122 positions that could be cut or reassigned without hurting operating capability. (See p. 4.)

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The thrust of Marine Corps Inspector General inspections ~~should be changed~~. Reports are compliance oriented, contain insignificant findings, and usually do not develop the causes of problems disclosed during inspections. (See p. 11.)

Staff also could be used more effectively by reducing the frequency of noncombat force inspections which are twice as frequent as the combat force inspections. (See pp. 13-14.)

Temporary inspectors are used extensively, some to inspect their own units. Personnel from one activity complained that such temporary inspectors were not objective. GAO believes using temporary inspectors in this manner invites problems. (See pp. 15-16.)

The Field Audit Service should consist primarily of qualified civilians, with some administrative inspection positions also filled by civilians. This would bring the Marine Corps more in line with the Department of Defense policy of filling each position with a civilian unless it can be proven that a military person is required. Also, it could save money because it costs less to use civilian personnel than military personnel of comparable rank. (See p. 17.)

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Overinspection and duplication are problems. Some officials prevent duplication by alternating inspector general inspections with

Temporary
Inspection
Personnel
management
Audits

Reductions in force (manpower)

Investigations
into reduced
agencies
~~Investigations~~

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FGMSD-80-20

Internal audits

those of other oversight groups. However, other activities did not do this and GAO identified duplicate findings by comparing reports of the Inspector General, other oversight groups, and preinspections by unit personnel in preparation for inspector general visits. (See p. 19.)

The November 1978 DOD policy on releasing Inspector General reports and documentation to GAO, as implemented by the Marine Corps, worked well for this review. (See pp. 23-24.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Secretary of the Navy should direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to:

- Reduce the authorized staffing level of the Field Audit Service by 42 positions.
- Analyze the structure of the Field Audit Service with the intent of further reducing authorized staff.
- Revise the Field Audit Service staffing criteria so that individual positions--not teams of auditors--are authorized commensurate with the workload.
- Modify the Inspector General's approach to inspections so that causes of significant problems are determined by tracing them throughout the system, including headquarters levels. The Inspector General should consider an inspection approach similar to that of the Army Inspector General.
- Reduce the frequency of noncombat unit inspections.
- Require that temporary inspectors' work be monitored to promote objectivity and that temporaries come from units that do not have a routine working relationship with the unit to be inspected.
- Require that some of the inspection and most of the Field Audit Service positions be staffed with qualified civilians to the greatest extent possible.

--Coordinate the work of the Inspector General and other review groups to eliminate duplication and require that the various review groups use each other's work to reduce the scope of their efforts. Conducting no-notice or limited notice inspections might give a more accurate picture of the units' status.

As instructed by the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, House Government Operations Committee, GAO did not obtain written comments from the Marine Corps on this report. However, GAO considered Marine Corps officials' views in preparing the report.



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ABBREVIATIONS

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In November 1978, the Department of Defense (DOD) adopted a new policy for releasing inspector general reports to GAO. The Chairman, Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, House Committee on Government Operations, subsequently asked us to review the inspector general functions of the Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Defense Logistics Agency to determine whether this policy would solve the longstanding problem of GAO access to these reports. This report is the third in the series. The Air Force and Army reports were issued on August 28, 1979, 1/ and October 30, 1979, 2/ respectively.

HOW THE INSPECTION SYSTEM FUNCTIONS

The first Inspector General of the Marine Corps was appointed in 1945. When the Secretary of the Navy issued instructions to create the Naval Inspector General's office, he authorized the Commandant of the Marine Corps to determine which Marine missions and functions could be aided by an inspector general in the Marine Corps.

The Marine Corps inspector general system is centralized. All of its full-time personnel work for the Inspector General who reports directly to the Commandant and may confer with the Secretary of the Navy. The Inspector General conducts inspections and investigations as directed by the Commandant, and audits all Marine Corps nonappropriated fund activities except exchanges.

During fiscal 1978, the Marine Corps Inspector General was authorized 145 full-time staff and also required about 425 part-time inspectors. The 145 positions are divided into an inspection staff of 11, a field audit service of 122, and 12 other positions including the Inspector General, his assistants, and administrative personnel. The total cost of the Inspector General's operations for fiscal 1978 was about \$5 million with \$2.2 million chargeable to inspection and \$2.8 million to nonappropriated fund audits. (See app. IV.)

1/"A Look at the Air Force Inspector General's Inspection System," FGMSD-79-51, Aug. 28, 1979.

2/"The Army Inspector General's Inspections--Changing From a Compliance to a Systems Emphasis," FGMSD-80-1, Oct. 30, 1979.

of the Marine Corps

The Inspector General inspected 271 activities in fiscal 1978 using the 11 full-time inspectors heavily aided by temporary inspectors from other Marine Corps activities. Also, the Inspector General's Field Audit Service audited the accounting practices of 146 nonappropriated fund activities with total revenue of about \$94 million. The types of activities audited included officer and enlisted personnel clubs; rod and gun clubs; and welfare, recreation, and chapel funds.

In addition to inspections and audits, the Inspector General takes complaints and conducts informal investigations and inquiries into allegations of misconduct or wrongdoing. During the first half of fiscal 1979, 130 personnel filed complaints with the Inspector General. He conducted only four investigations over the last 3 years.

TYPES OF INSPECTIONS

With the exception of occasional followup inspections--called special inspections--the command inspection is the only inspection conducted by the Inspector General. The inspection program's objectives are broad. Inspection teams are required to evaluate leadership and use of resources; welfare, morale, and discipline; compliance with Marine Corps policies and procedures; work practices and safety and health conditions; and local inspection procedures. Guided by these objectives, inspectors evaluate 50 to 85 functional areas at each Marine Corps command visited.

The Marine Corps Inspector General does not conduct operational readiness inspections. The Commandant is apprised of the Corps' operational readiness by the Fleet Marine Forces' operational commanders.

MARINE CORPS INSPECTOR GENERAL SYSTEM DIFFERS FROM CIVIL AGENCY COUNTERPARTS

The civil agency inspectors general were created on October 12, 1978, by Public Law 95-452, primarily to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse. They are centralized, independent organizations with combined audit and investigative capabilities. The civil agency inspectors general are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for an unlimited term. They report to, and are under the general supervision of, their agency heads. They also report results of their efforts periodically to the Congress. The civil agency inspectors general can be removed from office only by the President who must communicate the reasons for such action to the Congress.

The Marine Corps and civil agency inspectors general are similar in that both have an inspection and audit function combined under one individual who reports to the head of the agency. However, the Marine Corps Inspector General does not report to the Congress as do the civil agency inspectors general.

Three organizations perform audits to detect fraud, waste, and abuse in the Marine Corps. One of them is the Inspector General's Field Audit Service which audits all non-appropriated fund activities except exchanges. The exchanges are audited by the Marine Corps Exchange Service's Internal Audit Office. The Naval Audit Service performs audits of Marine Corps appropriated fund activities. In addition, the Naval Investigative Service is responsible for investigating fraud in Marine Corps appropriated and nonappropriated fund areas.

Marine Corps Inspector General inspections are not designed to detect fraud, waste, and abuse. Inspections usually last only 1 to 7 days and use guidelines or checklists to review for compliance with procedures. The inspections are broad in scope and shallow in depth and the inspection reports do not contain recommendations.

We reviewed a number of inspection reports and the operations of the Field Audit Service. Based on our review and discussions with Marine Corps officials, we developed conclusions and recommendations for

- reducing the staff and costs for the Field Audit Service;
- improving the inspection system; and
- reducing overinspection and duplication of inspection effort.

These matters are discussed in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 2

OPPORTUNITIES TO SAVE COSTS AND CUT STAFF

IN THE FIELD AUDIT SERVICE

The Inspector General's Field Audit Service is overstaffed by at least 22 positions and possibly as many as 42, resulting in unnecessary audit costs of as much as \$1 million annually. Marine Corps staffing standards authorize more audit personnel than needed. Moreover, the Field Audit Service was authorized even more personnel than these liberal staffing standards permit. Also, the Marine Corps did not take advantage of staffing cuts available by combining audit staffs at the same location or within close proximity.

The Field Audit Service staffing levels could be cut or reassigned without hurting operating capability.

FIELD AUDIT SERVICE IS OVERSTAFFED

We observed that some Field Audit Service auditors did not appear busy at the activities we visited. For example, at one of the activities, the audit staff expended one staff-year at a cost of about \$22,500 auditing a recreation fund with fiscal 1978 income of about \$47,000 and net worth of about \$40,000.

We compared the staffing of the Field Audit Service with the Marine Corps Exchange Service's Internal Audit Office which is responsible for auditing all 17 exchanges. In fiscal 1978, this office had 11 employees who audited these exchanges which had total revenues of \$287 million.³⁰ Thus, each exchange auditor was responsible for more than ~~three~~ times as much revenue per auditor as the Inspector General's 122 Field Audit Service auditors who audited total revenues of \$94 million in fiscal 1978.

STAFFING STANDARDS ARE NOT RELATED TO WORKLOAD

We found that the Marine Corps has developed staffing standards for the Field Audit Service which authorize auditor staffing levels for various Marine Corps units based on the amount of annual revenue generated by the units' nonappropriated funds activities. The following table shows the authorized staffing levels.

<u>Type of unit</u>	<u>Amount of revenue (in millions)/ number of audit staff authorized</u>		
	Headquarters	<u>Under \$8</u> 12	<u>Over \$8</u> 16
Bases	<u>Under \$10</u> 4	<u>\$10-25</u> 8	<u>Over \$25</u> 12
Divisions, air- craft wings, re- cruit depots, etc.	<u>Under \$15</u> 4	<u>Over \$15</u> 8	

The staffing standards require that a minimum of four auditors be assigned to each Field Audit Service office regardless of the amount of funds to be audited. They also require that when the revenue generated by units exceeds the levels shown above, an additional four-person team be assigned regardless of whether the revenue increase warrants four additional positions.

The Field Audit Service staffing standards thus permit identical staffing levels at Marine Corps units despite large differences in the amount of revenues to be reviewed. For example, a team of four auditors was authorized at one unit that had about \$400,000 of nonappropriated fund revenue and the same number of auditors was authorized at another unit with \$4.3 million, or more than 10 times as much revenue.

Moreover, we noted that four division and wing Field Audit Service offices were authorized four auditors each, even though three of them had no division or wing nonappropriated funds to audit, and the other had only one fund with about \$15,000 of revenue. Since there were little or no funds to be audited, these auditor positions were being used to augment 20 base auditor positions in reviewing \$45.1 million of base nonappropriated funds. Marine Corps officials felt that the 16 division and wing auditors were needed for contingency purposes because they would accompany combat troops to remote sites during war. We believe this is not an effective use of resources in a peacetime environment.

CUTTING 22 POSITIONS WOULD
NOT HURT MISSION

We compared authorized fiscal 1979 staffing levels to the staffing standards and found that the Field Audit Service had been authorized 6 more positions than even the liberal staffing criteria allowed. Coupled with the 16 auditor positions already mentioned with little or no division or wing

funds to audit, we believe the Field Audit Service authorized staff could easily be reduced by 22 positions without adversely affecting its mission. We discussed this situation with Inspector General officials who agreed that the Field Audit Service had about 22 excess positions.

The officials attributed the excess positions primarily to reductions over the last several years in the number of activities and amount of funds to be audited by the Field Audit Service without commensurate staffing level reductions. In August 1967, when the Marine Corps shifted responsibility for auditing exchanges from the Field Audit Service to the Marine Corps Exchange Service's Internal Audit Office, it did not correspondingly reduce the number of Field Audit Service auditor positions. Another change in audit responsibilities occurred when the Norfolk area audit office was closed as a result of Camp Elmore closing its club system. Two of the four Norfolk Field Audit Service auditor positions were reassigned to other audit offices instead of being eliminated.

COMBINING AUDIT STAFFS
COULD CUT 20 MORE JOBS

The Marine Corps could further reduce its Field Audit Service staffing levels if it combined different offices located at the same site as well as offices located near each other. We identified 20 positions that could be reduced by combining offices and applying the Marine Corps staffing standards to the combined offices. All of the combined offices for three of the four potential combinations are within 60 miles of each other. The offices for the fourth--the Barstow and 29 Palms Bases--are within 140 miles of each other. The following table illustrates how this reduction would occur.

Marine Corps officials acknowledged that some of the offices in the table could be consolidated and function just as well, although they did not agree that a reduction of 20 positions would be possible.

<u>Combining staffs at:</u>	FY 1978 combined revenue of offices (millions)	Auditors currently authorized (note a)	Auditors authorized based on combined revenue	Excess positions (col. 2 minus col. 3)
North Carolina:				
Camp Lejeune Marine Corps Base	\$ 7.9	4		
2d Marine Division	1.1	4		
Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station	2.9	4		
New River Marine Corps Air Station	<u>1.6</u>	<u>4</u>		
Total North Carolina	13.5	16	8	8
South Carolina:				
Parris Island Marine Corps Recruit Depot	2.6	4		
Beaufort Marine Corps Air Station	<u>1.8</u>	<u>4</u>		
Total South Carolina	4.4	8	4	4
California (Barstow area):				
Barstow Marine Corps Logistics Base	.4	4		
29 Palms Marine Corps Base	<u>2.6</u>	<u>4</u>		
Total Barstow area	3.0	8	4	4
California (San Diego area):				
Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base	8.2	4		
1st Marine Division	.1	4		
San Diego Marine Corps Recruit Depot	<u>3.3</u>	<u>4</u>		
Total San Diego area	<u>11.6</u>	<u>12</u>	8	4
Total	<u><u>\$32.5</u></u>	<u><u>44</u></u>	<u><u>24</u></u>	<u><u>20</u></u>

a/The numbers in this column do not include the 22 positions by which these bases and activities were shown to be overstaffed in the preceding pages of this report.

DOD STUDY SAW EXCESS STAFFING

In its November 3, 1978, draft report entitled "Study of the Operations and Relationships of Audit, Inspection and Review Groups in the Department of Defense," a DOD joint study group noted that the full-time assignment of 122 Marines for auditing nonappropriated funds was excessive and not cost effective. The draft report states that the Field Audit Service performed extensive verifications of individual accounting entries, made monthly reviews of clubs' financial statements and accounting entries, and in effect did a complete financial audit of each major nonappropriated fund activity about twice each year. The report adds that:

"The amount of effort expended by the Field Audit Service in performing audits * * * far exceeded the time expended by the internal audit organizations for auditing similar functions. For example, the Field Audit Service expended 72 mandays, the equivalent of \$4,500 in personnel costs, to audit a local flying club whose FY 77 income and expenses totalled \$24,289 and \$21,490, respectively. At the same base the Field Audit Service spends about 1,980 mandays annually to audit the local officer and enlisted club systems. For comparison, an internal audit organization would spend about 700 mandays to audit a club system of about twice the size every 3 years.

"The annual revenues and total asset values of the 145 Marine Corps NAFI's [nonappropriated fund instrumentalities] audited by the Field Audit Service were \$82 million and \$92 million, respectively. It seems illogical to devote the time of 122 people to audit these * * * resources when the NAVAUDSVC [Naval Audit Service] has only 555 personnel to audit the principal Navy and Marine Corps operations supported by about \$37 billion in appropriated funds annually."

The draft report recommends that the responsibility for auditing the Marine Corps nonappropriated funds be transferred, along with the appropriate number of personnel spaces, to the Naval Audit Service where such reviews could be performed more efficiently and economically.

FIELD AUDIT SERVICE COSTS NOT REIMBURSED

The Field Audit Service reviews are cost free to the nonappropriated fund activities. DOD regulations authorize auditors paid from appropriated funds to audit nonappropriated

fund activities without charge. However, GAO has reported on several occasions that this practice is questionable from a management viewpoint. For example, our report on the Naval Audit Service 1/ concluded that

"Using internal auditors to review nonappropriated fund activities is questionable from a management viewpoint because these audits represent a free service provided at the taxpayers' expense to activities which were set up to be largely self-supporting."

We recommended that the Naval Audit Service reduce audits of nonappropriated fund activities.

Some of the Marine Corps nonappropriated fund activities are audited annually by public accounting firms in addition to the Field Audit Service reviews. For example, for fiscal 1978, a public accounting firm was granted \$17,500 from nonappropriated funds to audit some of the Marine Corps' nonappropriated funds. Moreover, the costs for the Marine Corps Exchange Service's Internal Audit Office are financed entirely from nonappropriated funds. However, none of the Field Audit Service costs (about \$2.8 million for fiscal 1978) which are paid from appropriated funds, are reimbursed from the nonappropriated funds.

CONCLUSIONS

The Inspector General's Field Audit Service is significantly overstaffed. We identified 42 excess positions and we believe additional staff reductions could be made if the Marine Corps revises its staffing standards so that Field Audit Service offices are staffed according to need.

DOD has decided that using auditors paid from appropriated funds to audit nonappropriated funds is an acceptable practice. However, we believe that if the Field Audit Service costs had to be paid from the nonappropriated funds, the excessive audits of these funds would stop or be reduced because fund management would not be willing to pay for unnecessary audit work. Since the audits are provided free, there is no incentive to manage the amount of Field Audit Service effort devoted to reviewing these funds.

1/"The Naval Audit Service Should Be Strengthened," FGMSD-78-5, Nov. 11, 1977.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of the Navy direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to:

- Reduce authorized staffing levels of the Field Audit Service by 42 positions.
- Analyze the structure of the Field Audit Service with the intent of further reducing authorized staff.
- Revise the Field Audit Service staffing criteria so that individual positions--not teams of auditors--are authorized commensurate with the workload.

CHAPTER 3

INSPECTIONS AND REPORTS

CAN BE IMPROVED

Inspectors are not required to prepare formal working papers to support their work and findings, so documented evidence of the quality of their work is scarce. Instead of working papers, inspectors rely on a verification process whereby inspected officials are briefed and the facts are agreed upon. To determine the quality of inspections, we interviewed inspected officials, followed up on selected findings, and observed portions of ongoing inspections. Our observations of inspections are included in appendix V.

Marine Corps officials believed that inspections are beneficial because they provide information about the state of morale and discipline and the extent to which subordinate activities comply with directives. However, some officials felt that many of the discrepancies noted were not in important areas, such as the mission of the unit, and were insignificant.

Our review of reports showed that, like the Air Force management effectiveness and lower level Army general inspection reports, Marine Corps Inspector General reports are almost totally compliance oriented, contain many insignificant findings, and do not normally identify the causes of problems disclosed during inspections. In addition, we found that inspection reports may give misleading evaluations, and that inspection resources are not used effectively.

INSPECTION REPORTS INCLUDE MINOR DEFICIENCIES

The inspection reports we reviewed included what appeared to be relatively minor deficiencies, such as:

- One Marine was encountered whose military appearance was poor because of weight distribution, but he was not assigned to the Military Appearance Program.
- The mail orderly had personal gear in the mail room.
- Both of the officers inspected had nonregulation haircuts.
- Revalidation for entitlement to wear the Navy and Marine Corps parachute insignia had not been recorded in all cases.

--Messmen were assigned for less than 30 consecutive days and never had time to develop skills in their areas of responsibility.

--Marines tended to bunch at the pivot point during column movements.

A significant amount of inspection effort is devoted to evaluation of military appearance and troop related areas. For example, at one command we observed the inspection team chief, a colonel, inspect the condition and fit of each non-commissioned officer's uniform for 5 minutes. The inspector used a ruler to measure the distance between the Marines' pants cuffs and the floor and the separation between campaign ribbons, badges, etc., and various reference points on the uniform.

All of the inspection reports that we reviewed included the results of physical fitness tests that are conducted for the Inspector General's observation. One Marine official told us the requirement to perform physical fitness tests for the Inspector General and demonstrate proficiency in close order drill was ridiculous because his unit, a flying organization, drills only when the Inspector General arrives. The official said that the Inspector General could review the unit's physical fitness training records in lieu of testing the Marines. Ironically, the inspection team performed a thorough evaluation of the physical fitness of this unit's personnel. However, the team did not review the unit's embarkation/mobilization function even though serious questions about the unit's ability to perform this major function were noted by its headquarters staff before the inspection.

INSPECTIONS DO NOT FULLY DEVELOP FINDINGS

Inspection procedures require that the inspectors search for trends or causes to problems rather than an inventory of symptoms. However, the Marine Corps Inspector General inspections are almost totally compliance oriented and do not normally show causes for identified discrepancies or offer recommendations for corrective actions. Thus, in attempting to correct problems, officials may be wasting resources by treating symptoms rather than causes.

For example, one report stated that individual weapons needed maintenance. The reason the weapons had not been maintained was not identified. The commanding officer responding to the report said there was a shortage of rifle and pistol parts and that he felt it was more beneficial to use the weapons for training as they were until parts were available. If

the inspector had looked into this problem rather than merely performing a compliance inspection, he would have discovered this situation. This in turn might have led him to discover a potentially more serious problem, such as a parts shortage at that command.

We believe that Marine Corps findings, like those of lower level Air Force and Army inspections, are not fully developed because of the broad scope and short duration of the inspections. Marine Corps inspections cover 50 to 85 functional areas in 1 to 7 days.

As mentioned in our report on the Army, the Army Headquarters Inspector General uses an inspection approach where the inspection starts at a lower level of a major command, such as a brigade, and continues through successive echelons of the command, including the command's headquarters level. The Army Inspector General uses this approach to identify causes of significant systems problems rather than conducting broad compliance types of inspections.

The Marine Corps Inspector General inspections, on the other hand, are almost totally compliance oriented, and the headquarters offices are not directly inspected. The assistant commandant advised us that the inspections of the lower level units give him a good indication of the effectiveness of his headquarters offices. However, we believe this may not be a good practice and could result in an unfair or misleading impression of an area. For example, we noted that an inspector gave a Marine Corps wing an excellent rating in the intelligence/counterintelligence area. However, the wing headquarters official responsible for this area told us that he was surprised at the rating because, although his section had prepared for the inspection, no one from the Inspector General's inspection team showed up to evaluate the unit. An Inspector General official advised us that the inspection team did not have an inspector qualified to inspect this area. The excellent rating for the wing was not based on a functional review of the area but was based only on verifying that intelligence regulations and procedures at the wing's squadron level were up-to-date.

INSPECTION RESOURCES COULD BE MORE EFFECTIVELY USED

The Marine Corps Inspector General's resources are not used effectively. Seventy-five Marine Corps noncombat or administrative units are inspected annually while more than 300 combat units are inspected biennially. An Inspector General official explained that noncombat units are smaller, commanded by officers of lower rank, and therefore require more

frequent oversight than the larger, combat units. However, we believe that annual compliance inspections of units like detachments that typically provide administrative support of Marines attending schools, is excessive compared to biennial inspections of combat units like the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing which could be called into a wartime situation at any time.

In addition, every 2 years, the Inspector General inspects 52 Marine Corps Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps units located at high schools throughout the country. A Marine Corps official estimated that generally about 50 staff-days were required each year to do this. We advised Marine Corps officials that inspecting these units was questionable. A Marine Corps official subsequently advised us that the newly appointed Inspector General apparently agrees because he decided to reduce such inspections.

CONCLUSIONS

The Marine Corps Inspector General's inspections and reports provide information on how well units are complying with regulations and may be of some benefit in ensuring discipline. However, we believe that the Inspector General should rely on individual Marine Corps commanders to monitor these areas regularly and that he should use his limited resources to evaluate more significant areas and develop causes of systems problems. The approach used by the Army Headquarters Inspector General might be applicable to the Marine Corps. Also, the Inspector General's decision to reduce inspections of Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps units will result in improved resource use. Reducing the frequency of the noncombat/administrative unit inspections also could result in more effective use of resources.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of the Navy direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to:

- Modify his inspection approach so that causes of significant problems are determined by tracing them throughout the system, including headquarters levels. He should consider an approach similar to that of the Army Inspector General.
- Reduce the frequency of noncombat unit inspections.

CHAPTER 4

OPPORTUNITIES TO STRENGTHEN

THE INSPECTION SYSTEM

Staffing of the Marine Corps inspection function differs from staffing those of the Air Force and the Army because the Marine Corps inspection system is centralized. Also, because of staff and budget limitations, the Inspector General relies almost entirely on temporary inspectors who take part in an inspection and then return to their regular jobs. As noted in the Army report, relying on temporary inspectors can cause problems. We also found that more civilians could be used in both the audit and inspection functions and that the qualifications of the auditors were questionable.

EVALUATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY OF AUDITORS AND INSPECTORS

Although the Inspector General's Field Audit Service auditors are independent, neither the full-time nor the temporary inspectors are independent in the sense that the auditors are, primarily because they are not permanently assigned to the inspection function. The full-time inspectors are selected for 2-year tours and are then reassigned. This arrangement permits the possibility that inspectors could be influenced by former ties or anticipated relationships with their commands. One of the full-time inspectors acknowledged his concern about this, saying he felt that some of the Fleet Marine Force Commanders might not like some of their inspection ratings and might hold that against the inspector.

While their lack of independence creates a potential for lack of objectivity, we did not note any instances when full-time inspectors were not objective. However, as we noted in our report on the Army Inspector General system, there can be problems when temporary inspectors are assigned to inspections of the same activities that they work with during their regular assignments.

There are advantages and disadvantages associated with using temporary inspectors. The major advantages are that it allows for a smaller full-time staff and temporary inspectors provide expertise in specialized areas. The Inspector General felt that he would probably need a full-time staff of over 130 inspectors instead of the present 11, if he did not rely on temporaries. The major disadvantages of using temporary inspectors are that, because of their regular involvement in an area, they may be unwilling to report or unable to recognize problem areas.

During our review, we noted temporary inspectors reviewing units within their own command. An officer was inspecting base food services activities even though as part of his regular job he was responsible for those activities. On the same inspection, temporary inspectors were inspecting units within their own regiments. In both cases, objections were raised by those being inspected. Marine Corps officials advised us that in this instance travel fund restrictions necessitated using temporaries from the inspected unit and that this was not the normal policy for using temporary inspectors.

The Inspector General recognizes that there is a potential for conflict of interest when temporary inspectors are used. He noted that some temporary inspectors have treated their temporary assignment as inspectors as a chance to conduct a staff visit to their specific area of responsibility and that in some cases the findings rendered by the temporaries were not substantive. The Inspector General attributed the problem to the possibility that some temporary inspectors chose not to ally themselves with the overall Inspector General effort, but rather with some smaller project with which they were concerned. In an effort to control this situation, the Inspector General established a procedure whereby, prior to leaving for an inspection, the head of the inspection team conducts a preinspection briefing for the temporary inspectors. The temporaries are reminded that they are inspecting for, and reporting to, the Inspector General of the Marine Corps for the duration of the inspection.

USING MORE CIVILIANS COULD SAVE MONEY

The Marine Corps inspection system is not employing civilians as extensively as it could. Only 4 of the 142 staff authorized to the Inspector General during fiscal 1979, or less than 3 percent, are civilians, and all 4 are in clerical or administrative positions.

As we noted in our report on the Air Force inspection system, DOD's policy is to use civilians unless it can be proven that a military person is required. We also noted that cost savings could be realized in the Air Force if civilians were appointed to fill some of the military personnel slots in the inspection system. We believe cost savings are also possible if civilians are appointed to some of the Marine Corps inspection system positions. The extent of the savings depends on whether there is an overall decrease in Marine Corps personnel, either by attrition or by a reduction in recruiting due to replacing military personnel with civilians.

There are advantages and disadvantages associated with using civilians in military inspection systems. The major disadvantage cited by the Marine Corps Inspector General was that civilians would not understand military issues. A major advantage we see for the Marine Corps, besides possible cost savings, is that use of civilians would allow additional military personnel to be used to offset shortages in key positions. Another major advantage is that use of civilians in some of the key management positions of the inspection system might provide continuity in the inspection system because they are not subject to the 2-year tour.

We believe most, if not all, of the Field Audit Service positions should be filled by civilians as the Marine Corps Internal Audit Office is. A small number of the positions could be military for use in combat situations. We also believe that some of the inspection positions such as the assistant inspector general, the head of the administrative branch, and the analysis, oversight, and follow-up officer could be civilians without adversely affecting the inspection system.

STAFF QUALIFICATIONS

The personnel assigned to the inspection function are generally well qualified, and all of the full-time inspection positions are staffed with officers. The Marine Corps does not formally train its inspectors but relies instead on on-the-job training. The inspectors were generally well educated. For example, we sampled the academic credentials of 45 Marines and civilian employees from the inspection team and found that about 70 percent had a bachelor's, or higher, degree.

About 75 percent of the Field Audit Service positions are staffed with enlisted personnel. The qualifications of the Field Audit Service staff were questionable. The Field Audit Service qualifications criteria are very liberal and permit virtually anyone who has passed the high school general education test to be eligible for an auditor position--if the person is enrolled in an introductory accounting course and completes off-duty college courses, such as auditing, management, and business law, on a continuing basis.

At one of the Field Audit Service locations we found that, despite the relatively low qualification criteria, one of the 10 auditors assigned had not completed introductory accounting even though he had been assigned to the Field Audit Service for 2 years, and only 3 of the 10 auditors had completed introductory accounting prior to entry. We were advised that all the auditors had completed a 6-month on-the-job training program.

We were unable to verify this, however, because participation in the program was not documented.

We analyzed the education and military background of 116 Marines assigned to the Field Audit Service. Their military backgrounds were varied and included such disciplines as electronics, disbursing, administration, personnel, mess management, bookkeeping and some combat skills such as amphibious warfare and mortar operation. About 20 percent of the Marines whose records we reviewed held bachelor's or higher degrees, and 45 percent did not have formal education beyond high school. A Defense Department joint study group draft report commenting on the formal audit education of Field Audit Service personnel noted that their formal audit education or training equivalent was less than that required for a civilian accountant or auditor.

CONCLUSIONS

The Marine Corps relies extensively on temporary inspectors. The Inspector General probably would have to significantly increase the size of his full-time inspection staff if he were to eliminate the use of temporaries and still provide the present inspection coverage. The Inspector General has recognized the potential problems in using temporary inspectors and provides guidance to them on their role as inspectors before each job. The Inspector General should eliminate using temporary inspectors taken from activities that have a routine working relationship with the inspected unit.

While we agree that the inspection function is primarily a military one that should be conducted predominantly by military personnel, some of the full-time inspection positions could be staffed with civilians. Also, the use of qualified civilians in the Field Audit Service may result in a more efficient and cost effective system.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of the Navy direct that the Commandant of the Marine Corps:

- Require that temporary inspectors' work be monitored to promote objectivity and that temporaries come from units that do not have a routine working relationship with the unit to be inspected.
- Require that some of the inspection and most of the Field Audit Service positions be staffed with qualified civilians to the greatest extent possible.

CHAPTER 5

OVERINSPECTION AND DUPLICATION

ARE PROBLEMS

As in the Air Force and Army inspection systems, overinspection and duplication are problems in the Marine Corps. We identified instances where officials were preventing duplication by alternating inspections conducted by different groups. However, some activities were not doing this, so Inspector General inspections duplicated those of other oversight groups and units' self-inspections (performed to get ready for Inspector General visits). We believe substantial resources could be saved or redirected to more productive areas if overinspection and duplication are reduced and eventually eliminated.

POTENTIAL FOR DUPLICATION RECOGNIZED

Since 1968, GAO has reported to the Congress several times concerning the many groups in DOD performing management reviews and evaluations, more or less independently of each other. We reported a growth in the number of such groups, striking sameness of authorized areas of interest, seeming overlap of functions, some confusion as to assigned responsibilities, and an apparent need for some measure of overall coordination and guidance of the total review effort. There has been no apparent improvement because the DOD Joint Study Group on Audits, Inspection, and Reviews noted in its draft report of November 3, 1978, the existence of over 350 such groups. The report said that the existence of so many groups significantly increased the likelihood that several groups performed similar missions and responsibilities in almost every phase of DOD operations.

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL DOES NOT COORDINATE, OVERSEE, OR PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO OTHER INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

The charter of the Marine Corps Inspector General does not require him to coordinate or supervise the various inspection and evaluation functions of the Corps. We noted that individual commanders conduct self-inspections to learn about the overall condition of their respective commands. In addition, there are several other evaluation groups in the Marine Corps that conduct inspections. For example, the Field Supply and Maintenance Analysis Office and the food service management team issue reports about supply, maintenance, and food service management problems.

The Marine Corps does not have an audit agency but instead relies on the Naval Audit Service to audit its appropriated fund programs. Because of the differences in scope and approach between the Inspector General inspections and Naval Audit Service reviews, we do not believe significant duplication occurs between them. However, we identified duplication between the Inspector General reviews, units' self-inspection in preparation for the inspector general visits, the supply and maintenance reviews, and the food service management service reviews.

PREPARING FOR INSPECTIONS CAUSES DUPLICATION

All of the Inspector General's inspections are announced 2 years in advance. One of the perceived benefits of this approach is that it allows the inspected activity to "clean up" in preparation for the inspection. However, a disadvantage is that it can result in duplication when the activities conduct formal self-inspections. It also gives a misleading picture of the unit's ability to perform its mission on a regular, routine basis. We noted several instances where this occurred.

Marine Corps orders at some of the lower level activities we visited require the activities to perform formal inspections in preparation for an Inspector General inspection. For example, one order requires that detailed preinspections be done about six months before the Inspector General inspection to assess a unit's ability to perform its assigned missions. The results of a preinspection are reported to an activity's commander. However, commanders generally view these reports as internal management products. Consequently, the reports are not provided to the Inspector General even though he could use them to modify the scope of his inspections and preclude duplication.

For example, beginning 4 months before the scheduled inspector general inspection, representatives from the headquarters command of a unit to be inspected began conducting a self-inspection to ensure that prior inspection findings had been corrected and to keep the unit from receiving an unsatisfactory rating. The command headquarters personnel visited the unit three times in a 4-month period prior to the Inspector General inspection and spent 74 staff-days evaluating 21 functional areas. The self-inspection report noted 183 discrepancies, including major problems with aircraft maintenance and embarkation preparedness. After some followup self-inspections, the unit's commanding officer was advised that the unit would pass the Inspector General's inspection with flying colors.

The Inspector General inspection was conducted one week after the last self-inspection and used about 72 staff-days to evaluate 17 functional areas, 13 of which had been evaluated by the inspected unit's headquarters. The report gave the unit an overall excellent rating, but noted 26 relatively minor faults.

NO-NOTICE INSPECTIONS MIGHT ASSURE FASTER
RESPONSE TO FINDINGS AND GIVE A BETTER
PICTURE OF A UNIT'S STATUS

The Marine Corps Inspector General's followup system consists of obtaining formal responses from the inspected units on cited problems and reviewing the responses to determine if proposed remedies will correct the problems. However, regardless of this procedure, a problem may not really be corrected because of personnel changes, or it may recur because the symptom and not the cause was corrected. The final proof of corrective action occurs during the next inspection of a unit when the findings in the previous inspection report are checked. Most of the findings we reviewed had been corrected and Inspector General reports contained few repeat findings. However, some commanders considered the discrepancies cited by the Inspector General less than mission critical and assigned them a low priority.

As noted above, just before the next inspector general review, a unit will perform a self-inspection to make sure that findings in the Inspector General's previous report are corrected. It is likely that corrections would be made sooner if the Inspector General conducted his inspections on a no-notice basis (although the Marine Corps' extensive use of temporary inspectors might hamper performance of no-notice inspections). Units would then be unable to postpone corrections, or risk having a repeat finding because they would not know exactly when the next inspector general review would occur. No-notice Inspector General reviews might also give a more accurate picture of a unit's ability to perform its mission on a regular basis.

SOME MANAGEMENT TEAM REPORTS
ALSO DUPLICATE INSPECTOR
GENERAL REPORTS

We compared Inspector General, field supply and maintenance analysis, and food management team reports and found that the Inspector General inspects basically the same areas, and in several instances reported virtually identical discrepancies. We identified an example where a September 1977 food management team report duplicated a July 1977 Inspector General report and another example where an October 1978 Inspector General report

duplicated a May 1978 field supply and maintenance analysis report. In neither case did the later reports indicate whether or not the problems were already being corrected as a result of the earlier reports.

CONCLUSIONS

Duplication of inspection efforts is a problem in the Marine Corps because there is no single Marine Corps staff activity charged with coordinating the many inspections, analyses, and evaluations now occurring. Duplication occurs between Inspector General inspections, units' self-inspections conducted in preparation for Inspector General visits, and other groups' evaluations. While self-inspection is a good concept, its overuse wastes resources and diverts attention from essential areas.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Secretary of the Navy direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to coordinate the work of the Inspector General and other review groups to eliminate duplication and require that the various review groups use each other's work to reduce the scope of their efforts. Conducting no-notice or limited notice inspections might give a more accurate picture of a unit's status.

CHAPTER 6

ACCESS TO INSPECTION

REPORTS NOT A PROBLEM DURING

THIS REVIEW

Historically, DOD's policy has been that inspector general reports shall not be furnished to GAO except upon approval of the secretary of the military department concerned. However, on November 6, 1978, DOD adopted a new policy for releasing inspector general reports to GAO which provides that:

"Every effort should be made to accommodate the specific needs of GAO on a case-by-case basis-- including, as appropriate, release of reports and records, or access without releasing physical custody of the files or reports.

"Each DOD component is authorized to delegate the authority for access to and release of Inspector General reports.

"In those instances where mutual accomodation cannot be worked out, the issue should be forwarded to the Secretary of the Military Department or head of the Defense agency for decision. The Comptroller General has indicated that he will be personally available for discussions to determine whether the needed information can be supplied in some other manner."

Secretary of the Navy instructions have been revised to reflect the new DOD policy. The revised instructions authorize the Commandant to release Marine Corps Inspector General reports and records.

GAO RECEIVED COMPLETE ACCESS TO REPORTS DURING THIS REVIEW

GAO received excellent cooperation from the Marine Corps during this review. We requested and received copies of 41 inspector general inspection reports and related records. The Assistant Inspector General reviewed and promptly authorized release of the inspection reports.

We initially had some problems in gaining access to Field Supply and Maintenance Analysis Office reports. We wanted to compare them with inspector general reports to identify duplication. The Marine Corps subsequently established a procedure whereby we made written requests to the Commandant for

copies of these reports. We then received copies of all requested reports.

INFORMATION IN MARINE
INSPECTION REPORTS NOT
VALUABLE TO OTHER AGENCIES

The inspection reports we reviewed would be of little benefit to oversight activities outside the Marine Corps. If the Marine Corps changed its inspections from compliance/discipline to system type problems as discussed in chapter 3, then the reports would be of value to DOD and congressional decisionmakers.

CONCLUSIONS

DOD's new policy for releasing inspector general reports and records to GAO as implemented by the Marine Corps for this review is a workable solution to GAO obtaining the reports.

CHAPTER 7

SCOPE OF REVIEW

We visited 24 Marine Corps commands, units, and activities. They included Marine Corps Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Fleet Marine Force Headquarters-Pacific, Marine Corps Air Station, and 1st Marine Brigade, Hawaii; Camp Butler, 3d Marine Division, and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Okinawa, Japan; Camp Lejeune and 2d Marine Division, North Carolina; Camp Pendleton, 1st Marine Division, Marine Corps Logistics Base, El Toro Marine Corps Air Station, and 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, California. We also visited various Naval Audit Service, Naval Investigative Service, Field Audit Service, Field Supply and Maintenance Analysis, and food management team offices.

As agreed with representatives of the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, House Committee on Government Operations, we concentrated on the inspection function and did not evaluate the complaint and investigative functions. Because the largest number of Inspector General full-time personnel are assigned to the Field Audit Service, we evaluated the staffing levels of this office.

We obtained copies of 41 inspection reports and related records and reviewed them to determine the orientation of the inspection process and the types of discrepancies being reported. We observed portions of three separate inspections. We also compared inspector general reports to local inspection reports and other oversight review group reports to identify duplication of effort.

We interviewed the Under Secretary of the Navy and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Inspector General and Assistant Inspector General, and their staffs, to obtain an understanding of the methods and procedures used to carry out the mission and functions of the Inspector General. We interviewed commanding officers and other officials at each activity visited to obtain their views on the inspection system.

In addition, we contacted Naval Audit Service and internal review group personnel to determine the extent of coordination between them and the Inspector General. In addition, we interviewed members of two DOD task forces whose evaluations were concerned with the inspection systems. One task force was initiated by DOD while the other was required by the Inspector General Act of 1978, Public Law 95-452, of October 12, 1978.

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NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
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 OF THE
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November 13, 1978

Honorable Elmer B. Staats
 Comptroller General of the U.S.
 General Accounting Office
 441 G Street, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear General:

As you know, through the efforts of Assistant Secretary Fred P. Wacker the Department of Defense adopted on November 6, 1978 a new policy for releasing Inspector General reports to GAO. While I remain concerned over past refusals of the Department of Defense to provide GAO necessary information, I am hopeful that this will mean GAO will have access to all the information it needs to be able to effectively carry out its work.


I believe it is in order, therefore, for GAO to immediately determine whether or not this new policy will in fact prove to be a workable solution to this long-standing problem. This can be best accomplished by a GAO review of the Inspector General functions of the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps and of the Defense Logistics Agency. Such a review will be timely in light of the study mandated in the Inspector General legislation and will assist the Subcommittee in its ongoing review of DoD internal management control activities. Such a study should encompass an evaluation of the organization, role, staffing, independence, quality of work and effectiveness of these agencies.

Because of the importance of this review, it will be necessary to have it completed as expeditiously as possible. I would expect to receive a final report on the Department of the Air Force Inspector General not later than May 31, 1979, final reports on the Navy and Marine Corps Inspectors General not later than July 31, 1979, and final reports on the Army and Defense Logistics Agency Inspectors General not later than September 30, 1979. While these are tight deadlines, they can be met if sufficient resources are devoted to this project. And, as usual, I request that GAO not provide draft reports to the affected agencies for official comment, which should also enable you to meet these deadlines.

I would appreciate it if the GAO staff members who will be assigned to this review would meet as soon as possible with members of my staff to discuss in detail the questions the Subcommittee desires to have dealt with by the review.

With best wishes I am

Sincerely yours,



JACK BROOKS
Chairman

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NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
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 OF THE
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March 28, 1979

Honorable Elmer B. Staats
 Comptroller General of the U. S.
 General Accounting Office
 441 G Street, N. W.
 Washington, D. C. 20548


Dear General:

Last November I asked GAO to conduct comprehensive reviews of the Inspector General functions of the Departments of Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Defense Logistics Agency. Since it is important to have the results of these reviews prior to the completion of the Department of Defense's own Task Force review of the operations of its audit, inspection and investigative components, I asked for early completion dates with the latest report being submitted to the Subcommittee no later than September 30, 1979.


It is now my understanding that GAO, after beginning work on these reviews, feels that more time than originally planned will be needed because of the sizes and differing organizational structures of these offices. This being the case, I am agreeable to allowing some additional time but must continue to stress the importance of the reviews being timely. It is, therefore, my hope that the Air Force report will be available no later than August 31, 1979, the Army report no later than October 31, 1979, and the Navy and Marine Corps and Defense Logistics Agency reports no later than December 31, 1979.

I appreciate the amount of resources and talent you are devoting to these important projects.

Sincerely,


 JACK BROOKS
 Chairman

**MARINE CORPS INSPECTOR
GENERAL ORGANIZATION**



MARINE CORPS INSPECTOR GENERAL
FISCAL 1978 STAFFING AND COSTS

	Staff authorized (note a)	Estimated cost (note b)
<u>INSPECTION</u>		
Full-time inspectors	14	\$ 620,000
Temporary inspectors	(c)	1,188,000
Administration	9	185,000
Travel and per diem	-	<u>228,000</u>
Total for inspection	23	2,221,000
<u>FIELD AUDIT SERVICE</u>		
Area offices	120	2,670,000
Headquarters	2	74,000
Travel and per diem	-	<u>28,000</u>
Total for Field Audit Service	<u>122</u>	<u>2,772,000</u>
 TOTAL	 <u>145</u>	 <u>\$4,993,000</u>

a/Staff authorized for fiscal 1978. The actual number assigned varies based on retirements, transfers, etc. For example, during fiscal 1978, the Field Audit Service was authorized 122 positions, and 121 were actually assigned as of September 30, 1978. During fiscal 1979 the audit function was authorized 120 positions, and 115 were actually assigned as of June 1979.

b/Estimated salary and benefit costs computed by multiplying estimated staff years expended by standard DOD fiscal 1977 cost data.

c/The Marine Corps estimated that 425 temporary inspectors worked 38.4 staff-years in fiscal 1978.

GAO OBSERVATIONS OF INSPECTIONS

We observed portions of three Inspector General inspections, but were not able to observe an entire inspection because of the large number of inspectors involved and the simultaneous coverage of multiple areas. The Commandant and key headquarters staff are given an informal briefing on findings after each inspection.

MARINE BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, D.C.

We observed part of the Inspector General's March 1979 inspection of the Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C. The inspection team was comprised of 34 people who inspected 45 activities and events.

The inspectors we observed were courteous and professional, and appeared well qualified in the areas they inspected. The temporary inspectors operated independently of the inspection team. When discrepancies were found, the inspectors informed the appropriate supervisor and, in most cases, counseled him on the consequences of not complying with directives. The inspectors also suggested methods for correcting the discrepancies.

Some inspectors used checklists to guide them while others relied on memory and an established routine.

One functional area inspection, including the inspector's outbriefing of the officer in charge, lasted less than 3 hours. The inspector said his inspection was brief because he was aware of a preinspection staff visit 2 weeks earlier and of the observations made at that time.

The inspection team leader personally conducted a uniform inspection of nine officers and 7 percent of the staff non-commissioned officers assigned to the Barracks. He took about 5 minutes to inspect each Marine. The inspection was very thorough and involved using a ruler to measure garment lengths and distance between insignia and badges and various reference points on the uniforms. The inspector compared the decorations on each noncommissioned officer with the Marine's personal record book and questioned each one to determine his knowledge of the prescribed manner to wear the uniform.

MARINE AIR RESERVE TRAINING DETACHMENT,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

During March 22-23, 1979, the Inspector General checked the Marine Air Reserve Training Detachment, Washington, D.C.

The inspection team was basically the same one that inspected the Marine Barracks. Temporary inspectors were added to inspect air crew training. We observed only one functional area inspection at this unit.

The functional inspector advised us that the inspection would not be as in depth for the reserve unit as it would for an active duty unit because of the reserves' limited drill time. He did not use a checklist or inspection guide and told us he was totally familiar with the criteria the activity must meet for the inspection.

The portion of the inspection we observed began 45 minutes late because the two officers assigned to the section to be inspected were required to participate in a physical fitness examination. The inspection was limited and consisted of visually examining a wall chart and reviewing individual records to determine if they were up to date and had been annotated to comply with applicable directives. The inspection required 1 hour and 30 minutes.

MARINE CORPS ACTIVITIES ON OKINAWA

During May 7-24, 1979, the Inspector General reviewed six activities on Okinawa and mainland Japan. The inspection team consisted of 183 members--57 from headquarters, 97 from commands on Okinawa, and 29 from other commands. In addition, 57 people from Okinawan commands gave full-time administrative and logistical support to the inspection team.

We accompanied some of the inspectors on their inspection of the 3d Marine Division on the island and observed inspections in 6 functional areas. All the inspectors appeared very knowledgeable in the areas they were inspecting and conducted the inspections professionally. The inspections served as a training/assistance session as well as an inspection. When discrepancies were noted they were generally brought to the attention of the personnel who worked in the areas being inspected, and correction instructions were given. In four areas checklists were used, and the inspections were almost totally compliance oriented.

We found several instances where temporary inspectors were inspecting units of the command to which they were assigned. Officials said that this normally was not done but, because of budget constraints, travel funds were not available to bring enough inspectors from Headquarters and commands outside Okinawa to avoid this situation.

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